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ARGUMENT I 
PLAINTIFF CONFUSINGLY AND INCORRECTLY 
CITES AND APPLIES UTAH LAW AS TO 
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS 
First, the Plaintiff admits(page 11 of Brief of Appellee) that 
the ONLY GROUNDS for shareholder liability in this action is 
because the shareholders, 
"... failed to insure that NOTICE to the creditors was given 
before dissolution and also failed to insure that debts owed 
by the corporation were satisfied before the corporation's 
assets were distributed to its shareholders." 
The Plaintiff then cites portions of the Utah Code 16-10a 
subsections 1408, and 1406(2), (either intentionally or 
negligently) failing to cite the balance of the applicable of code 
sections. The balance of those code sections are determinative of 
the results of this action. It's kind of like picking and choosing 
only the portions of the section you want while discarding the bad 
parts. 
Second, the Plaintiff cites Boyle v. Colorado Patio, 654 P2d 
335, as supporting the Plaintiff's argument that lack of notice to 
corporate creditors in dissolution of a corporation automatically 
implies liability to the shareholders. The case has no such 
holding. 
The problem is that the Plaintiff has improperly mixed, 
equated and applied two different laws; namely the Bulk Sales Law 
Utah Code 70A-6-101 et seq, and dissolution of a corporation Utah 
Code 16-10a-1401 et seq, borrowing portions from both laws as he 
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chooses. Plaintiff improperly mixes parts of the two laws to 
suggest that notice is a requirement to avoid shareholder 
liability. Then Plaintiff then applies Boyle, supra, a Colorado 
case, as support for the argument. Boyle, supra, however does not 
base its holding on Utah statutory law or even Colorado statutory 
law, but on common law and Tort. The convoluted analysis of the 
statutory law and the application of Boyle, simply makes no sense. 
Lets look at corporate dissolution and shareholder liability 
under Utah law. To find individual shareholder liability the code 
specifically provides, section 1408(2), that 
"...Total liability may not exceed the total value of the 
assets distributed to him..." 
That doesn't mean as Plaintiff states, that Defendant is deemed to 
have received assets of a value equal to the debt. It is limited 
to the value of the assets actually distributed to him. If the 
Plaintiffs argument was applied in this action the individual 
shareholders could be responsible for a debt far exceeding the 
value of the corporation's assets, irrespective of what was 
actually distributed to him (It is noted that all of the 
shareholders specifically deny receiving any distribution of any 
assets of the corporation in this action, thus posing a issue of 
fact which can not be inferred in law). 
Further, Utah law, section 16-10a-1406(2), provides the ONLY 
method for dissolving corporations and the ONLY method by which a 
shareholder may have liability imposed on him by any creditor of 
the corporation. Subsection (3) does provide a method for a 
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shareholder to limit his liability, that is by giving notice. 
Subsection (5) provides that if the notice is properly given then 
no claim can be had against the shareholders or the corporation. 
This code section does not require the notice but only provides a 
method to limit any claims that may be presented against a 
corporation or a shareholder. Lack of notice is not a fraud, nor 
does it automatically imply shareholder liability, as proposed by 
the Plaintiff. 
In this action the Defendant admits not giving notice as is 
possible under 16-10a-1406, which allows the Plaintiff to proceed 
against the corporation on whatever claim he may have against the 
corporation. However, lack of the notice does not expand the 
effect of the code, and provide exposure to the individual 
shareholders beyond that provided by the law in section 16-10a-
1408, ie, to the amount of assets distributed to him. 
Plaintiff cites Boyle, supra a Colorado case hoping to salvage 
and support his lack of notice argument. However, Boyle, only 
applies Colorado law,(none of which is cited by the Plaintiff) 
which deals with the Bulk Sales law and has no reference to any 
corporate dissolution law. Most importantly the court there found 
as the basis of liability to the individual shareholder was a 
BREACH OP A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP, a tort, the holding was not 
based on an application of the notice requirements of the Bulk 
Sales law or of a statutory dissolution law. Breach of fiduciary 
duty does imply individual liability when it is found. The court 
stated the sole shareholder, page 337; 
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"...Breached his fiduciary obligation not to defeat the claims 
of third-party creditors, the trial court properly entered 
judgment against defendant individually." 
Bovle, supra simply has no application to this action whatsoever. 
There are no findings in this action of any breach of a fiduciary 
duty, and in fact the Plaintiff admits that the only basis for 
liability is statutory i.e., because each individual shareholder 
was "deemed" to have had distributed to him the full amount of 
Plaintiffs claim. That simply is not the law in Utah. The trial 
court simply erred in finding any liability to any shareholder. 
ARGUMENT II 
NUMEROUS MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
EXIST WHICH PREVENT A GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The sole basis of the Plaintiff's argument is that the 
Defendants misrepresented what the Brinecell model 216 would 
produce. Generally the Plaintiff claims the misrepresentation to 
be that the Brinecell unit would not produce 10% sodium 
hypochlorite. However, the Defendant's set forth in affidavit and 
in written advertising, that the Brinecell unit would only produce 
an equivalent 10% sodium hypochlorite(R0263,0271) . The difference 
of an equivalent chemical, to the Defendants, was not important 
because the Defendant believed that the Plaintiff only intended to 
use the Brinecell unit for bleaching. The compound produced by the 
Brinecell unit, an equivalent of sodium hypochlorite is better than 
sodium hypochlorite when used for bleaching(R0263,0271). That 
material fact is disputed by the Defendants and forms the basis for 
all of Plaintiff's claims. Hence the court improperly granted 
summary judgment. 
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The Defendant has already set forth the other facts which are 
disputed, in its opening brief and need not restate those facts 
which controvert all material facts that the court must use to 
grant judgment as requested by Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court simply erred in granting summary judgment in 
this matter for all of the reason set forth in the Appellants 
opening brief. Additionally there can be no finding of judgment 
against the individual shareholders except in accordance with the 
Utah Code 16-10a-1408, and the court may not DEEM there to have 
been a distribution, nor the value of the distribution. There must 
have been a specific finding as to a distribution, and it's value, 
prior to sustaining a judgment even if all of the other material 
facts were not controverted. 
DATED this ^~ ( day of March, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
f—-t?3 ^ - ^ ^ - — - -
ftlCHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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